The movement of going under is fundamentally significant for transitions that could occur from out of the history of Beyng. Never being the fullness of essence, the Nothing places a limit on Beyng, constantly thwarts its unfolding, and maint For Heidegger, a demand issues from the fact of mortality, which calls for the human being to take up the task of building a life that responds to its relative brevity. For Levinas, a demand issues from the infinite otherness and finitude of This thesis shows that the demands of finitude found in the work of both philosophers constitute a common ground that overcomes the tendency among scholars to find a complete incompatibility between a Heideggerian ante-ethical ontology and a Levinasian ethics as first philosophy.
The thesis concludes by reflecting how, existentially, the individual can respond to the co-demands of the finitude of being with others and being before death. Remove from this list. I proceed in three steps. First, I provide an analysis that identifies four central aspects of action and show that phenomenologically-inspired Embodied Cognition does not adequately account for them.
Second, I provide a descriptive phenomenological analysis of everyday action and show that concern is the best candidate for an explanation Third, I show that concern, understood as the integration of affect and embodied understanding, allows us to explain the different aspects of action sufficiently. Emotions in Philosophy of Mind.
Understanding in Epistemology. That is, her discovery is that a woman is the result of a process that made so that she is like she is.
Husserl’s Phenomenology and Sartre’s Existentialism
The first is its ideology in the proper, Marxian, sense. My claim is that the work still pays a heavy price This ballast depends firstly on the inherited prevailing climate of opinion, corresponding to a situation of alienation, producing two distorted views of the male and female gender. A book is also the produce of an author with a story living in one society at a given time of social history. In this case, the book was written in the after war when women were being pushed again back home from the wartime labour market, when several of the goals reached by the first phase of feminist movements had gone lost in several European countries under Fascist or semi-Fascist regimes and were being eroded in America by the reactionary climate of Maccartism.
It was a book written by an intellectual young woman in almost total isolation. The reconstruction of the idea of femininity is still the most fruitful part of the work. It rejects the idea of femininity as an essence, depending on biology or other factors and explores the idea of a making of this image as a result of a factual condition made of social and economic state of affairs but as revived and actively mirrored through and by the consciousness of the very subjects suffering an oppressive situation.
Later feminist writers, for ex. Shulamit Firestone, remarked that the Second Sex was heavily conditioned by key-ideas from Sartre existential ontology. One crucial aspect is accepting the mind-body dualistic framework without any suspicion that such dualism could have been itself a projection of the basic experience of the male-female duality. But is becomes a boomerang when it is used to interpret any kind of relationship, leading to equate inter-subjectivity with conflict.
These suggestions, yet, are evoked here and there but never fully spelled out. The most shocking consequence of acceptance of the Cartesian or Sartrean dualist view is an almost total de-evaluation of sexuality, understood as an activity involving just one tiny part of the human body, going with the idea that overcoming the oppression of women implies de-empathizing bodily differences that are after all tiny and devoid of value.
The eventual reason for such step back is the distorting Cartesian mirror into which Beauvoir still looks in the vain hope of discovering a disembodied self as the Cartesian subject of an impossible kind of liberation. Jean-Paul Sartre in Continental Philosophy. Simone de Beauvoir in Continental Philosophy. This article first summarizes her phenomenological account of the complex layers involved in Critical-philosophical commentary on theses defended in scientific articles may be guided by two distinct perspectives, each leading to inquiries and styles of responses that are both distinct and complementary: an internal perspective and an external perspective.
The internal commentator belongs to the same epistemological field of the authors and, as such, shares the same categorical assumptions and the same Weltanschauung explored in the text. The dialogue with this commentator emphasizes the minutiae of the observation of the shared scientific reality and The external commentator, in contrast, emphasizes the categorical Mental Illness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Psychiatric Taxonomy in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. The aim of my paper is to review the discussion concerning various difficulties which surround the definition of depression and the methods of diagnosing and treating the disease against the background of the now dominant reductionist paradigm in psychiatry, as well as to answer the question whether a new approach to psychiatric disorders proposed by philosophers of psychiatry working within the phenomenologically inspired embodied and enactive paradigm indeed offers a solution to these difficulties.
I present the issues specific to the In the second part of the paper, I consider enactive, phenomenological and embodied theories of depression and the possibilities of new methods of treatment. My goal is to assess whether these theories indeed add anything important to the conceptions that are already present in psychiatry. I conclude that even if the embodied philosophy of psychiatry does not solve many of the problems faced by modern psychiatry, it can, nevertheless, provide a useful theoretical basis for future changes.
Depression in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Philosophy of Psychiatry in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. This article provides concrete examples of a phenomenological approach to empathy training, which is a pedagogical method designed for higher education. First, the phenomenology of empathy and empathy training is briefly described.
Second, excerpts from training sessions in higher education are provided as examples. The examples are meant as to concretize the purpose of the training in relation to the overall pedagogical process. Many new mothers question the nature of their motherly love after birth. This affectionate relationship towards the infant is commonly called bonding in everyday speech, clinical practice and research.
This study aims to explore the phenomenon of disturbed maternal affection through the clinical case of one mother who experienced severe and prolonged disturbances. The mother developed depressive symptoms from not feeling enough for her child, not the opposite, as is often hypothesized. This article develops a new phenomenological analysis of the interpersonal motives and structure of shame. I pursue the argument that shame is rooted in our desire for social affirmation and conditioned by our ability to see ourselves as we appear to others. My central thesis is that shame is what we feel when, due to some trait or action of ours, we come to perceive ourselves as fundamentally despicable and non-affirmable.
By showing how our urge for affirmation fuels and informs Furthermore, it sheds new light on some central aspects of shame that have been insufficiently understood: on the emotional charge and quality of shame, on the role played by our values and identity in shame, and on the continuity, differences, and transfers between personal shame, social shame, and embarrassment.
McDowell is committed to giving concepts a role in our embodied coping, extending rational form to human experience. Brandom is committed to defining concepts in a way that helps make rationality distinct. These commitments appear irreconcilable. Concepts in Philosophy of Mind. German Idealism in European Philosophy. Michail M. Einheit, das historisch und systematisch interpretiert und erschlossen wird.
Continental Aesthetics in Continental Philosophy. Continental Ethics in Continental Philosophy.
French Philosophy in European Philosophy. Do we empathize with music?
In the Name of Phenomenology – By Simon Glendinning
Ordinarily we consider our perception Despite the variety of stances which Brentano expressed on ontology, metaphysics, and psychology over the course of his career, the five general principles remain central to his whole philosophy throughout: they have an important place in what could be called Brentano's philosophical worldview or system.
By extension, they also are essential to his conception of phenomenology. Brentano and Other Philosophers in 19th Century Philosophy. In this paper I carry out a philosophical inquiry that yields an account of religion as a personal disposition. Philosophy of Religion. Thomas Aquinas in Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy.
Of course this view led to the discovery that a lot of words were not names after all.
Frontiers | Naturalizing Phenomenology: A Must Have? | Psychology
But suppose you have a true name in this sense. The relationship involved between the name and the object surely cries out for an ontological analysis. The object can hardly be part of the name, nor are name and object identical. There must then be some relation that ties them together in such a way that the existence of the object can be deduced from the meaningfulness of the name. What could it be? It seems to me that Kripke's idea of a rigid designator contains, and does nothing to solve, these same problems. The discussions of causality and the historical chain certainly are interesting and philosophically illuminating in various respects.
But with regard to the central issue of how the name is necessarily attached to the object, Moses or Ben Franklin etc. Of course the most famous interpretation of the reality hook in this century must be in terms of neither functions or names, but in terms of variables. To be sure, the variable is nothing without the function and the quantifier.
Quine writes an essay "On What There Is. Rather, he only discusses certain bad arguments from certain linguistic facts indeed, names to the existence of certain types of entities; and then he tells us what that linguistic fact is from which one can properly argue to the existence of objects. His well-known slogan is that "to be is to be in the range of a bound variable"—surely in a true sentence or theory. All of the mechanisms of functions and quantifiers are required to spell this out.
But he would be caught in a vicious regress if he were maintaining in all generality that to be is to be related what relation? For that can't then, without a regress, also be what it is for a variable statement, theory to be. And surely a thing could not be in the range of reference of—that is, have a certain relation to—a pronoun or variable unless that pronoun or variable itself existed.
One might suppose there are no relations to what does not exist. And shall we indeed say that for a variable statement, theory to be, it must be the value of a bound variable in a metalinguistic statement in a or the true metalinguistic theory? Perhaps Quine should be understood as saying only that if something or a certain kind of thing falls in the range of the bound variable in the true theory, then we may be certain that it exists.
There is no doubt in my mind that Quine does not, with his well-known slogan, intend to give a necessary condition of existence itself, an analysis of what it is for something to exist. It seems to me that all he says about scientific theory would rule that out. Indeed, on p.
But surely the philosophical interest in Quine's formula largely depends upon its being taken without such disclaimers. As he says in his opening lines of his famous essay, the ontological question is, "What is there? Or perhaps the essay is written upon the tacit assumption, never at any point discussed or justified, that the conditions of being are the same as or necessarily connected with the conditions of being known. That some such assumption is present is, I think, shown by the fact that the slogan shows up in a paper entitled "On What There Is.
One might spell out a way in which knowledge and truth true theory necessitates the existence of corresponding objects, as Husserl tries to do. But it seems to me that, while dumping names in favor of variables may well get rid of some bad ontological inferences, we are still left with an ontological blur between the variable and what falls in its range.
It just turns out not to be true, as Quine somewhere says, that talk about "miles" is inherently better as a way of doing philosophy that talk about miles. It can be a refreshing change, and you get a different set of issues, examination of which may even throw some light in some contexts on the epistemology and ontology of miles or whatever else the topic may be.
And it may seem like a revolution, as in fact it did, when one is sick to death of talking about ideas, impressions, and experiences of miles etc. But if Husserl is right in his general analysis, it would not help to just change the subject to "language. In addition, you may have lost the crucial element of intentionality, which may alone make meaning, truth and the existential tie possible. Of course the problems are neck-deep at this point.
Serious ontological work has to be done before functions, names, variables and all the other members of the language family can be used to much purpose in solid philosophical work. Given Husserl's analysis of what it is to be and how being is known, his account of the sorts of objects there are follows. Every subject of properties exists or has being. It is possible to determine that many types of subjects of thought and discourse have properties. Husserl's views concerning the major classes of existents turn out to be remarkably commonsensical.
Mental acts and their concrete and abstract elements including universals , with the states of affairs and events they make up, stand in the epistemically strongest position, because of their perfectly translucent character, which, supposedly, permits the totality of their aspects to be given simultaneously in one completely intuitive act of cognition. Universals not, properly speaking, instanced in mental acts can in part be fully given e.
In any case, if we are taking a philosophical inventory of existents, mental acts as individuals of a certain type, with their various dependent moments , universals, events and facts go in with absolute Evidenz. One who has appropriately investigated them after the requisite phenomenological clarifications cannot be mistaken in supposing them to exist.
Beyond these, and in a somewhat weaker position epistemically, there are bodies and minds, in the ordinary sense of the intersubjective world, along with the natural world and its social, historical, cultural and intellectual units and processes. It would, as he explains in the last chapters of Ideen I , nevertheless be unreasonable to reject the existence of, say, apples, given a thorough examination of one by the usual means. There is nothing more that one could reasonably require, once you know what kind of thing an apple is. This picture of Husserl's ontology amounts to saying that the objects met with in his description of "The World of the Natural Standpoint," in Ideen I , really do exist.
In this respect Husserl's view of the "real" world is very like that outlined in the opening paragraph of G. Moore's "The Defense of Common Sense. If minds had never come into existence in our universe otherwise as it is, there would still be facts, classes, universals, etc. Then in mid-career the irreelle emerges as a crucial component of Husserl's ontology—one not at all, in my opinion, to be confused with the Ideal.
The irreelle exists because it has, on Husserl's account, properties of its own. And finally we have to add to Husserl's list of true beings the peculiar features and structures of the "Life world. On the other hand, my guess is that Husserl is not what has in recent years been called a "Scientific Realist.
While, it seems to me, Husserl did not agree that knowledge generally was without absolute foundations, he conceded the point for factual domains considered as totalities. Dallas Willard. Phenomenology and Metaphysics. Article Tags husserl , ontology , phenomenology , metaphysics , logic , knowledge , science , realism. Phenomenology — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Browse the 20th Century era within the In Our Time archive. From Altruism to Wittgenstein, philosophers, theories and key themes.
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